CONTINUED DEVELOPMENT OF SECURITY STRATEGIES FOR
AMERICAN PORTS
(Published October
2002)
In what has come to be known as the "Post-September 11 World," strategies for ensuring the security of vessels, terminals, and people at American ports have continued to evolve. This is another installment in a series of reports on the emerging field of U.S. homeland security as it relates to the maritime sector of the nation's economy.
Notice Of Arrival Rules To Become Permanent
Following the September 11, 2001 attacks, the Coast Guard made temporary changes to the requirements for notices of arrival and departure for most vessels over 300 gross tons. The initial rule changes were made at the local level by individual Captains of the Port. The Coast Guard followed up on October 4, 2001 with a rule titled "Temporary Requirements for Notification of Arrival in U.S. Ports." In its essence, this temporary rule increased the reporting requirements for such notices from 24 to 96 hours and mandated the reporting of specific information regarding the passengers, crewmembers, and cargo of vessels visiting U.S. ports. In most instances, the Notices of Arrival ("NOA") and corresponding Notices of Departure ("NOD") must be provided to the National Vessel Movement Center. Among the information required to be submitted to the Center is the name, date of birth, and nationality of each passenger and crewmember. The centralization of reporting creates security advantages which allow the Coast Guard to more easily track the movements of vessels, passengers and crewmembers.
The Interim Rule, initially set to expire on June 15, 2002, was extended to September 30, 2002 to allow for the development and adoption of a Permanent Rule [67 Fed. Reg. 37.682 (2002)]. The National Vessel Movement Center will use a newly adopted electronic Advance Notice of Arrival as its preferred method of gathering information about passengers, crewmembers and cargo on ships arriving in U.S. ports (Notification forms may be downloaded from the National Vessel Movement Center website at http://www.nvmc.uscg.gov. Questions regarding reporting requirements may be directed to the National Vessel Movement Center at (800) 708-9823 or (304) 264-2502, or by e-mail at sans@nvmc.uscg.gov). After September 18, 2002, the NOAs must also supply the Coast Guard with detailed information regarding the charterers of a vessel.
Container Security Initiative Picks Up Steam
The U.S. Customs Service effort to "push back the border" continues with the Container Security Initiative ("CSI"). The objective of the CSI is to protect the nation's ports from terror attacks such as the "nuke in a box" threat. By enlisting the cooperation of the governments of important trading partners, Customs hopes to intercept weapons of mass destruction or other materials being smuggled by terrorists, before they leave foreign ports bound for the U.S. In its initial phase, Customs identified 10 "Megaports" as targets for inclusion in the CSI. These were identified as the ports with the largest number of container exports to the United States. Customs has since expanded its list of target ports to the top 20 ports exporting containers to the U.S.
Top 20 Megaports:
1) Hong Kong
2) Shanghai, China
3) Singapore
4) Kaohsiung, China
5) Rotterdam, Netherlands
6) Pusan, Republic of Korea
7) Bremerhaven, Germany
8) Tokyo, Japan
9) Genoa, Italy
10) Yantian, China
11) Antwerp, Belgium
12) Nagoya, Japan
13) Le Havre, France
14) Hamburg, Germany
15) La Spezia, Italy
16) Felixstowe, United Kingdom
17) Algeciras, Spain
18) Kobe, Japan
19) Yokohama, Japan
20) Laem Chabang, Thailand
On June 4, 2002, Customs announced an agreement with authorities in Singapore to participate in the CSI. Other announcements of cooperation soon followed. As of the time of printing, six Megaports had formally signed onto the program: Singapore, Antwerp, Rotterdam, Le Havre, Bremerhaven and Hamburg. Customs has based a small team of inspectors in each of these foreign ports, equipped with U.S. targeting databases. The foreign-based U.S. Customs inspectors work closely with local customs officials to identify containers which pose a potential risk. Additionally, U.S. and Canadian customs officials have been working closely with one another to ensure the safety of containers offloaded in one country but bound by truck or rail for another. In Canada, the participating ports are Halifax, Montreal and Vancouver. American ports working with Canadian customs officials include Seattle, Tacoma and Newark. Discussions with overseas officials continue, in an effort to bring other Megaports into the CSI scheme.
Sea Cargo Targeting Initiative
In addition to the CSI operations underway around the globe, the Customs Service has recently established the Sea Cargo Targeting Initiative. This automated system is designed to improve the way high risk cargo is handled at U.S. Ports. The Sea Cargo Targeting Initiative consists of three major components: a) adding new criteria to the Customs Service's automated systems to reflect new information concerning terrorist activities; b) training personnel to review cargo manifests processed through the Automated Targeting System; and, c) standardizing procedures for dealing with high-risk cargo. As a practical matter, the Sea Cargo Targeting Initiative will increase the frequency and effectiveness of non-intrusive inspection methods for high risk cargo, including gamma ray scans, radiation detection, and examination of the integrity of the individual containers along with their seals.
Legislative Developments
The U.S. House of Representatives passed its own version of the Maritime Transportation Anti-Terrorism Act in June, 2002. The Senate passed its version in December, 2001. Among the additional security measures suggested by the House is a requirement the Coast Guard undertake vulnerability assessments of more than 300 U.S. ports, and a proposal that every cargo ship carry a transponder which would allow the Coast Guard to track vessel movements in real time. The House omitted the Senate's restriction on employment of those convicted of certain felonies from employment in the nation's ports. Possibly most significant is the difference in funding allocated by the two legislative bodies. The Senate provides for $390 million in its version, whereas the House version calls for approximately $225 million. A compromise version of the bill will likely be presented to the President later this year.
The United States continues to adapt to its new place in the world as a domestic target of international terrorists. Everyone involved in maritime industries should expect further evolution in the nation's security laws and regulations.
